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COUCH POTATOES BEWARE: THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S
EXCLUSION OF VIDEOCASSETTE EXHIBITION RIGHTS
FROM LICENSES GRANTING TELEVISION
EXHIBITION RIGHTS MAY DECREASE THE
AVAILABILITY OF RENTABLE FILMS
Society's fascination with electronic forms of entertainment began
with the development of the motion picture in the late 1890s., With the
advent of radio, people no longer had to leave their homes to be enter-
tained. The popularity of home entertainment continued with the inven-
tion of television. The development of the videocassette recorder added a
new dimension to home entertainment. Videocassette recorders gave
people the opportunity to watch current movies on their own television
sets without leaving the comfort of home. The popularity of this new
form of entertainment resulted in a booming videocassette rental business
for motion picture producers and retailers alike. As a result, numerous
copyright controversies arose concerning contracts failing to encompass
these technological advances because they were not anticipated by the
parties at the time of the contract. One copyright controversy that devel-
oped regarded whether licenses granting rights to exhibit copyrighted
works in theatres and on television extended to videocassette reproduc-
tion as well. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals confronted this prob-
lem in Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp.2 In Cohen, the court held that
a license conferring the right to exhibit a film by means of television did
not include the right to distribute videocassettes of the film.
3
FACTS: How AMBIGUOUS LICENSE LANGUAGE CREATED A
COPYRIGHT CONTROVERSY
In 1969, Herbert Cohen, copyright owner of the musical composi-
tion "Merry-Go-Round," granted H & J Pictures ("H & J") a synchroni-
zation license to use the song in the film Medium Cool (H & J Pictures
1968) for exhibition in theatres and on television.' The license granted H
& J "authority... to record, in any manner, medium, form or language,
the words and music of the musical composition ...with [Medium
Cool], all in accordance with the terms, conditions, and limitations here-
1. A. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN HISTORY 372 (1983).
2. 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1988).
3. Id. at 852.
4. Id.
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inafter set forth. . .. "I Paragraph four of the agreement stated:
The .. . license herein granted to perform . . . said musical
composition is granted for: (a) The exhibition of said motion
picture ... to audiences in motion picture theatres and other
places of public entertainment where motion pictures are cus-
tomarily exhibited... (b) The exhibition of said motion picture
... by means of television .... including 'pay television', 'sub-
scription television' and 'closed circuit into homes' television
6
Paragraph six limited the grant by reserving to the grantor "all rights
and uses in and to said musical composition, except those herein granted
to the Licensee . . . . "' H & J then assigned all of its rights, title and
interest in Medium Cool, including the license with Cohen, to Paramount
Pictures ("Paramount").'
Later, Paramount reproduced the film Medium Cool on videocasset-
tes. Each cassette included a recording of "Merry-Go-Round." Approx-
imately 2,725 videocassettes were sold by Paramount with revenues
totalling $69,024.26.'
Consequently, Cohen filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California against Paramount alleging copy-
right infringement of the musical composition "Merry-Go-Round." The
district court granted summary judgment for the defendant Para-
mount.1 ° Cohen appealed the district court's decision.
THE NINTH CIRCUIT LIMITED ITs ANALYSIS To AN
INTERPRETATION OF THE CONTRACT LANGUAGE
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision, conclud-
ing that a license conferring "exhibition by means of television" did not
include the right to reproduce and distribute the film on videocassettes.'
In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit addressed five separate
issues to justify relying solely on the contract language to resolve the
dispute.
First, the court distinguished television from videocassette display.12
5. Id. at 853.
6. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1570, 1571 (9th Cir. 1988).
7. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853.
8. Id. at 852.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 854.
12. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 854.
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The court disagreed with Paramount's contention that it had the right to
reproduce the copyrighted song on videocassettes pursuant to the license
language "in any manner, medium, form, or language."'1 3 The court
found that the broad grant of power was expressly limited by the license
language to two mediums, motion picture theatres and television.14 As a
result, Paramount argued videocassette display was indistinguishable
from "exhibition . . . by means of television."' 5 The Ninth Circuit re-
jected this argument as well. The court concluded that a fundamental
difference existed between exhibition by means of television and exhibi-
tion by means of a videocassette recorder.' 6 This difference centered
around the control of the display. Although both forms of exhibition are
displayed on a television set, the court found that the ability to control
television displays was considerably less than with videocassette
productions. 7
Second, the court concluded that because videocassettes had not
been invented for home use at the time of the grant in 1969, the con-
tracting parties could not have anticipated videocassette display as a
form of exhibition by means of television.18 Thus, Cohen could not have
contracted that right to H & J.' 9 As a result, the court found that the
reservation language in paragraph six of the contract precluded rights to
uses not then known or contemplated by the parties at the time of the
grant.
20
In reaching its conclusion, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals also
considered which license interpretation coincided with the purpose of the
Federal Copyright Act of 1909 ("Act"). The court of appeals disagreed
with the district court's decision granting Paramount rights to a previ-
13. Id. at 853.
14. Id. Paragraph four stated, "The... license herein granted to perform... said musical
composition is granted for: (a) The exhibition of said motion picture . . . to audiences in
motion picture theatres .... (b) The exhibition of said motion picture ... by means of televi-
sion. .. "
15. Id.
16. Id. at 854.
17. Cohen, 845 F.2d at 853-54. The court gave numerous examples of control differences
between the two mediums. One example included the fact that while a consumer's choice of
entertainment on television is limited by what is provided by the controlling networks on the
various channels, with the videocassette medium the consumer has complete discretion regard-
ing what to watch. Another example given was that with videocassettes the consumer has the
ability to stop and start the program at will, whereas with television the consumer is powerless
to stop the program or replay it. Id.
18. Id. at 854.
19. Id.
20. Id. Paragraph six reserved to the grantor "all rights and uses in and to said musical
composition, except those herein granted to the licensee . .. ."
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ously unknown medium because the district court's decision circum-
vented the Act's purpose. 2' The court relied on Washingtonian
Publishing Co. v. Pearson,22 Scott v. WKJG, Inc. 23 and Jondra Music Pub-
lishing Co. v. Melody Recording, Inc.24 to illustrate the Act's purpose.
In Washingtonian, the United States Supreme Court stated that
"[t]he Act of 1909 is... intended definitely to grant valuable, enforceable
rights to authors, publishers, etc., without burdensome requirements; 'to
afford greater encouragement to the protection of literary works of last-
ing benefit to the world.' "25 The courts in Scott 6 and Jondra27 also
expounded similar notions. Thus, the courts in each case reiterated the
general theme behind copyright law as set forth in Article I, Section 8,
Clause 8 of the United States Constitution: "The Congress shall have
power... to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing
for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their
respective writings and discoveries." Based on the rationale of those
cases, the Cohen court held that interpreting the license broadly to en-
compass a medium unknown at the time of the grant undercut the Act's
purpose by denying the author profit from the use of his work.28
Fourth, the court distinguished the Cohen license language from
similar licenses found in cases Paramount relied on. The Cohen court
found Platinum Record Co. v. Lucasfilm, Ltd. 29 and Rooney v. Columbia
21. Id.
22. 306 U.S. 30 (1939).
23. 376 F.2d 467 (7th Cir. 1967).
24. 506 F.2d 392 (3d Cir. 1974).
25. Washingtonian, 306 U.S. at 400. Washingtonian was also quoted in Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201 (1954), where the United States Supreme Court extended the Washingtonian
rationale to economics in concluding that the economic policy behind giving Congress the
power to grant copyrights was that "encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in '[s]cience
and useful [a]rts.'" Mazer, 347 U.S. at 201, 219 (1954).
26. The court stated that "[a] copyright is intended to protect authorship. The essence of
a copyright protection is the protection of originality rather than novelty or invention." Scott,
376 F.2d at 469.
27. The court stated that "The copyright law is enacted for the benefit of the composer in
accordance with the constitutional grant of Art. I, § 8, cl. 8 .... Jondra, 506 F.2d at 395.
28. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 854 (9th Cir. 1988).
29. 566 F. Supp. 226 (D.N.J. 1983). In Platinum, the plaintiff copyright owner granted
Lucasfilm the right to use "master recordings" or "matrixes" of four popular songs on the
American Graffiti (Universal 1973) soundtrack. The agreement stated that Lucasfilm had the
right to "exhibit, distribute, exploit, market and perform said motion picture, its air, screen
and television trailers, perpetually throughout the world by any means or methods now or
hereafter known." Id. at 227. When American Graffiti was released for sale and rental to the
public on videocassettes and videodiscs in 1980, the plaintiff sued alleging the license did not
grant Lucasfilm rights to distribute American Graffiti with the copyrighted songs on videocas-
settes and videodiscs. While the Platinum court found the contract language sufficiently broad
[Vol. 9
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Pictures Industries, Inc. 30 distinguishable because the licenses in those
cases explicitly granted exhibition rights in all mediums known or un-
known.31 This language was absent in the Cohen license. In so holding,
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored Paramount's argument that
both Platinum and Rooney also contained language equating exhibition
by means of videocassette recorders to exhibition by means of
television.32
Finally, the Ninth Circuit in its amended opinion considered the
definition of to perform or display a work "publicly" in section 10131 and
the exclusive rights of the copyright owner in section 106"4 of the Federal
Copyright Act.35 Paramount argued that the only rights available to the
to encompass videocassettes, the court also noted the decision was based on the decision in
Rooney v. Columbia Pictures Indus. Inc., 538 F. Supp. 211, 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), that exhibi-
tion by means of television and exhibition by means of a videocassette recorder were indistin-
guishable. Id.
30. In Rooney, actor Mickey Rooney brought suit against eight motion picture producers
and distributors. Rooney claimed that pursuant to their contract, the producers and distribu-
tors had no right to exhibit films containing his performances in any markets other than thea-
tres. The court concluded Rooney had no right to question the defendants' reproduction and
distribution of his films on videocassettes for two reasons. First, the court held that because
the contracts granted the motion picture company producers rights of exploitation to media
developed thereafter, Rooney could not argue that the exploitation provisions excluded devel-
opments not foreseen at the time of the agreement. Conceding this issue, Rooney then argued
the television exhibition rights did not extend to videocassette sales of the films. However, the
court held that regardless of "whether the exhibition apparatus is a home videocassette player
or a television station's broadcast transmitter, the films are 'exhibited' as images on home
television screens." Id. at 212, 228-29.
31. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 855 (9th Cir. 1988).
32. Id. at 855 n.3.
33. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986). Section 101 provides the definition for the public performance
or display of a work as follows:
(1) to perform or display it at a place open to the public or at any place where a
substantial number of persons outside of a normal circle of a family and its social
acquaintances is gathered; or
(2) to transmit or otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to
a place specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or display
receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or at different
times.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1986) provides:
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to author-
ize any of the following:
(1) to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; ...
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public
by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending;
(4) in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works,
pantomines, and motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copy-
righted work publicly. ...
Section 106 in its entirety lists the only rights the copyright owner possesses under the Act.
35. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1570, 1571 (9th Cir. 1988).
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grantee in performance or exhibition licenses were those of public per-
formance.36 Thus, the only limitations grantors could affix to perform-
ance licenses were limitations on public performances of their work.37
Because in-home videocassette performances are not considered public
performances under the Act,3" and thus are not protected by copyright
law, their exclusion from the contract was inappropriate.39
Once again the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Para-
mount. While acknowledging the license permitted the recording and
copying of the movie in any manner, medium, or form, the court found
no language authorizing distribution of those copies to the public by sale
or rental." Because distribution is a separate right in section 10641 of the
Act, the court concluded that the distribution right had to be expressly
granted in the license, otherwise the right remained with the grantor pur-
suant to the specific contract language.42 The court also refused to in-
clude the distribution right within the right to perform the work by
means of television.43
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Historically, courts have been open to expansive interpretations of
contract language when that language involves exhibition rights to copy-
righted works in known mediums but remains silent as to mediums not
envisioned at the time of the agreement. The development of this trend
can be traced to L. C. Page & Co. v. Fox Film Corp.44 In that case, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that a grant for "exclusive moving
picture rights" included both motion picture rights known at the time of
the grant and rights in technological improvements of motion pictures
36. Brief for Appellee at 1, Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1988).
37. Id.
38. See infra notes 109-21 and accompanying text.
39. Brief for Appellee at 2, Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.
1988).
40. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1570, 1571 (9th Cir. 1988).
41. See supra note 34.
42. Cohen, 7 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1571.
43. Id. at 1572. The court stated that
[p]aragraph 4(b) grants to Paramount the limited right to authorize broadcasters and
cable television companies to broadcast the movie over the airwaves or to transmit it
by cable, microwave, or some such means from a central location. The words of that
paragraph must be tortured to expand the limited right granted by that section to an
entirely different means of making that film available to the general public - the
distribution of individual videocassettes [sic] to the general public for private "per-
formances" in their homes.
Id.
44. 83 F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1936).
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(i.e., "talkies") not known or within the contemplation of the parties at
the time of the grant.45 In L. C. Page, the plaintiff obtained the exclusive
moving picture rights in a novel.46 The plaintiff subsequently granted
Principal Pictures Corporation all the movie picture rights to the novel
excluding rights to motion pictures with spoken words.47 The defendant,
Fox Film Corporation ("Fox"), then purchased the silent rights from
Principal Pictures and obtained a quitclaim conveyance from the novel-
ist.48 The plaintiff sued when Fox produced a talking motion picture of
the novel.49 The court found that although "talkies" were not commer-
cially known in 1923, inventors had been experimenting with the idea as
evidenced by L.C. Page's agreement with Principal Pictures Corpora-
tion.50 Thus, "talkies" were only a species of the genus motion picture as
both were exhibited in the same theaters, seen by the same audiences,
and exploited in the same area, thereby negating any contract violation.5
In Bartsch v. Metro-Goidwyn-Mayer, Inc.,52 the question arose
whether the grant of motion picture rights extended to television rights.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the grant included the
right to license a broadcaster to exhibit the motion picture on televi-
sion.5" In that case, the authors, composers, and publishers of a German
musical play assigned Hans Bartsch the motion picture rights to the
play.5 4 The grant included the rights "[t]o project, transmit, and other-
wise reproduce the said work or any adaptation or version thereof, visu-
ally or audibly by the art of cinematography or any process analogous
thereto, and to copyright, vend, license and exhibit such motion picture
photoplays throughout the world .... "55 Bartsch assigned his rights in
the musical to Warner Brothers who in turn assigned its rights to Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer ("MGM"). 56 MGM then made, distributed, and exhib-
ited a motion picture called Maytime (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1937)
45. Id. at 199. This holding was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Mur-
phy v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 112 F.2d 746 (9th Cir. 1940). In that case, the court held
that the language "complete and entire motion picture rights" included the right to produce
films with dialogue. Murphy, 112 F.2d at 748.
46. Id. at 198. L.C. Page & Co., Inc. obtained the rights to the novel "Captain January,"
written by Laura E. Richards. Id. at 197.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. L.C. Page, 83 F.2d at 197.
50. Id. at 198-99.
51. Id. at 199.
52. 391 F.2d 150 (2d Cir. 1968).
53. Id. at 155.
54. Id. at 151.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 152.
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based on the German musical." When MGM licensed the motion pic-
ture for television, Bartsch's widow sued for copyright infringement al-
leging that the original assignment of rights did not include television
transmissions.
58
As a result of this allegation, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
was confronted with the issue of whether a broad assignment of the right
"to copyright, vend, license and exhibit such motion picture photoplays
throughout the world" included the right to exhibit the copyrighted mo-
tion picture on television.59 The court looked to Professor Nimmer's
"The Law of Copyright" as authority on this issue.' Nimmer suggested
two alternative approaches courts could adopt when attempting to find
meaning in language that probably had none.6 Nimmer stated that
courts could either conclude that
a license of rights in a given medium (e.g., "motion picture
rights") includes only such uses as fall within the unambiguous
core meaning of the term (e.g., exhibition of motion picture film
in motion picture theaters) and exclude any uses which lie
within the ambiguous penumbra (e.g., exhibition of motion pic-
ture film on television) .... or determine [t]hat the licensee may
properly pursue any uses which may reasonably be said to fall
within the medium as described in the license.62
Professor Nimmer preferred the latter "ambiguous penumbra" ap-
proach, which the Bartsch court ultimately adopted.63 As a result, the
court found that television exhibition rights reasonably fell within the
medium of motion picture exhibition rights and thus were included in the
grant.64
In Landon v. 20th Century-Fox Film Corp.,6 the court dealt with
another variation of the problem concerning contract language which
was silent as to television rights, but which expressly granted motion pic-
ture rights. Landon applied the same approach adopted in Bartsch to
conclude that television serial rights were included in the grant of motion
picture rights.66 In that case, the dispute was whether author Margaret
57. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 152.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 155.
61. Id.
62. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10(B), at 10-85 - 10-86 (1988).
63. Bartsch, 391 F.2d at 155.
64. Id.
65. 384 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
66. Id. at 454-55.
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Landon's agreement with 20th Century-Fox Film Corporation ("Fox"),
granting motion picture rights to her novel "Anna and the King of
Siam," 6 authorized Fox to produce and exhibit a weekly television se-
rial.68 The contract provision gave Fox the "sole and exclusive motion
picture rights and motion picture copyright throughout the world
... ."69 Additionally, clause (c) of the contract gave Fox "[t]he sole and
exclusive right to make.., and generally deal in... and.., to adapt one
or more versions of said literary property ... "70 The court concluded
that the broad grant of the "sole and exclusive right to broadcast on
television any motion picture versions" included rights to broadcast a
television series taken from Landon's book, because the television serial
rights fell within the ambiguous penumbra of motion picture versions of
the book.7'
Another area where courts have extended contract language grant-
ing motion picture rights to television is in contracts where actors have
granted motion picture companies the rights to use their likenesses in
motion pictures. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dealt with this sit-
uation in Autry v. Republic Productions.72 In Autry, actor Gene Autry
agreed in five different contracts to grant
the producer . . . the right to photograph and/or otherwise
reproduce any and all of the acts, poses, plays, and appearances
of the artist.., including the right to use and exploit all or any
part of the same in such manner as the producer may desire,
and including, as well, the perpetual right to use name and like-
ness of artist and recordations and reproductions of his voice in
connection with advertising and exploitation thereof.73
Autry sought to restrain the defendant's exhibition of motion pictures
where he appeared in connection with television broadcasts on the theory
that the contracts only applied to motion pictures.74 In rejecting Autry's
argument, the court held that contract language giving the producer the
right to reproduce any "acts, poses, plays and appearances of the actor"
gave the producer unlimited rights to the photoplays, including the right
67. M. LANDON, ANNA AND THE KING OF SIAM (1944).
68. Landon, 384 F. Supp. at 452. This suit centered around the 1972 CBS television series
Anna and the King.
69. Id.
70. Id. Clause (f) also granted Fox television rights for any motion picture versions of the
book while specifically reserving to Landon the right to broadcast the literary property by
television direct from living actors. Id. at 453.
71. Id. at 454-55.
72. 213 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1954).
73. Id. at 668.
74. Id.
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to license such films for exhibition on television.75
Cases Extending Theatre And Television Exhibition Rights To The
Videocassette Medium
As technology continued to develop, courts were forced to continu-
ously address issues involving interpretations of industry contracts en-
compassing technological advances not anticipated by the parties at the
time of the contract. Two cases in which courts analyzed this problem in
terms of extending television exhibition rights to videocassette displays
were Platinum" and Rooney." Both Rooney and Platinum embraced
the approaches established by earlier cases forced to deal with developing
technological advances. By construing the licenses broadly so as not to
inhibit newly developed forms of exhibition, both courts adopted Nim-
mer's "ambiguous penumbra'" approach. Thus, the Platinum court ex-
tended the rights to exhibit American Graffiti in theatres and on
television to exhibition on videocassettes. Similarly, the Rooney court
also extended the rights to exhibit in theatres to exhibition in the video-
cassette market.
Nimmer's "Ambiguous Penumbra" Approach As Adopted In Cases
Advocating An Expansive Interpretation Of Contract
Language To Encompass Newly Developed
Technology
As noted earlier, Nimmer suggested two alternative approaches
courts could apply when interpreting contract language that is silent as
to the parties' intent because the mediums now available for exploitation
were not known at the time of the contract.79 Nimmer favored the "am-
biguous penumbra" approach.8" That approach allows the licensee to
pursue any uses which may reasonably be said to fall within the medium
described in the license. First, Nimmer concluded courts were more
equipped to determine which meanings were within reasonable limits
when no specific intent of the parties was ascertainable because no intent
probably ever existed.8' Secondly, Nimmer felt this approach was less
likely to prove unjust.82 Nimmer explained that it was more unjust to
75. Id. at 669.
76. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
77. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
78. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
79. Id.
80. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10(B), at 10-85 - 10-86 (1988).




require that licensees should have obtained further clarifications of mean-
ings already present than to hold that the licensor should have negated a
meaning that the licensee might rely on in the future.8 3
The adoption of Nimmer's approach is apparent in many court deci-
sions. The approach is consistent with L. C. Page, where that Qourt held
sound rights were within the ambiguous penumbra of motion picture
rights.8 4 The approach was also expressly adopted by the courts in
Bartsch 5 and Landon.8 6 Both courts extended motion picture exhibition
rights to television exhibition rights because exhibition by means of tele-
vision reasonably fell within the motion picture medium described in the
license. Nimmer himself explicitly extended the analysis from television
exhibition rights to videocassette reproductions in his treatise.8 7 The
Platinum holding directly coincides with this analysis. Commenting on
Platinum, Nimmer stated that while exhibition by means of television in
its unambiguous core meaning is limited to over-the-air broadcasts, in its
ambiguous penumbra, it includes any means by which the work could be
seen on television including cable television and videocassette uses.88
Violating The Public Performance Right Constitutes
Copyright Infringement
The copyright owner of a particular work possesses certain exclusive
rights to that work. The exclusive rights held by the copyright owner are
contained in section 106 of the Copyright Act.8 9 These rights are exclu-
sive unless the copyright owner authorizes a second party to use the
rights in connection with the copyrighted work. Thus, using a copy-
righted work is not an infringement if the use is not within the scope of
rights expressly granted to the copyright owner by section 106 of the
Act.
Included within the section 106 rights is the right to perform a work
publicly. A performance is public only if it satisfies either of the clauses
set forth in section 101.90 Therefore, to be considered a public perform-
ance under section 101, the performance or display must be either at a
public place or any place where a substantial amount of people are gath-
ered not including friends and relatives, or transmitted to the public by
83. Id. at 10-87.
84. Id
85. See supra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
87. 3 M. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.10(B), at 10-87 (1988).
88. Id.
89. See supra note 34 for the text of 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1986).
90. See supra note 33 for the text of 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1986).
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any device or process where the public is capable of receiving the per-
formance at the same place, at different places, at the same time, or at
different times.9'
Although the rights granted the copyright owner in section 106 are
exclusive, sections 107-118 contain specific limitations on those rights.
Section 110 of the Act sets forth specific acts which are not infringements
of the exclusive right to publicly perform a work under section 106.
Such noninfringing acts include performances by teachers or students in
the course of face-to-face teaching activities in nonprofit schools, per-
formances of religious nondramatic literary or musical works performed
in the course of religious services, performances of nondramatic literary
or musical works not performed for profit or transmitted to the public,
and communication of transmissions embodying performances by public
reception of the transmission on receivers commonly used in private
homes provided there is no direct public charge and the transmission
received is not transmitted further. The codification of section 11092 re-
sulted from the decision by the United States Supreme Court in Twenti-
eth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken.93 In Aiken, the Court held that a
restaurant owner's radio reception of plaintiffs' copyrighted songs pub-
licly for profit did not constitute a performance of the songs because the
owner was a mere listener.94
As a result of the Aiken decision and its codification into section 110
of the Act, the issue of whether videocassette exhibition constitutes a
public performance has been resolved by the Court. In Columbia Pic-
tures Industries, InG. v. Redd Horne, Inc.," the Third Circuit stated in
dicta that the sale or rental of videocassettes to consumers for home
viewing, although a performance, was not a public performance consti-
tuting copyright infringement.96 In Redd Home, the defendants were in
91. Id.
92. 17 U.S.C. § 110 (1986). Notwithstanding the provisions of § 106, the following are
not infringements of copyright:
(5) communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a
work by the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a
kind commonly used in private homes, unless -
(A) a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission; or
(B) the transmission thus received is further transmitted to the public; ....
93. 422 U.S. 151 (1975).
94. Id. at 164.
95. 749 F.2d 154 (3d Cir. 1984).
96. Id. at 157. In Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Aveco, Inc., 800 F.2d 59, 61 (3d Cir.
1986), the Third Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed its decision that the rental of videocassettes
for home viewing was not the type of public performance that resultel in a violation of the
Copyright Act. The facts in Aveco were essentially identical to those in Redd Horne except
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the business of selling and renting videocassette recorders and movies.9
In addition, the video stores exhibited films through an "in store rental"
system whereby customers chose a film and paid admission in return for
a private viewing room and free popcorn and soda.98 The copyright
owners of the films objected to the exhibition and sued the video stores
on the theory that the defendants' activities constituted a public perform-
ance of plaintiffs' motion pictures in violation of section 106 of the Act.99
The plaintiffs did not contend that videocassettes sold or rented for in-
home use were infringements of their exclusive rights."°° The court ap-
plied section 101 to classify the video stores' activities as public perform-
ances.' °' The court found the exhibitions open to the public and
indistinguishable from conventional movie theatres.102 Thus, the opera-
tion was a public performance constituting copyright infringement.
ANALYSIS: ALTHOUGH A CONTRACT INTERPRETATION Is THE
SAFEST WAY To ANALYZE THE CASE, IT Is NOT THE
BEST ANALYSIS FOR THIS COPYRIGHT
CONTROVERSY
The Ninth Circuit's decision relied solely on contract language and
ignored the copyright issues. Although that may be a legitimate ap-
proach to the problem, it is not the only approach. By relying on a strict
interpretation of the contract language, the court found a way to avoid
consideration of abundant case law and the suggested approach of a
noted authority on copyright. This point is apparent in footnote three of
the Cohen opinion.1° 3 In that footnote the court acknowledged Para-
mount's reliance on Rooney and Platinum's conclusions that exhibition
by means of a videocassette recorder is equivalent to television exhibi-
tion, but simply rejected those findings without any explanation.'
°4
Other approaches the Cohen court could have pursued include reading
the contract language expansively as earlier courts have done, construing
the contract in a manner consistent with Nimmer's suggested approach,
that in Aveco the customers operated the videocassette machines in private booths as opposed
to video store employees controlling the machines from a central location. Id. at 61.
97. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 156.
98. Id. at 157.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 158-59.
102. Redd Home, 749 F.2d at 159.
103. Cohen v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 845 F.2d 851, 855 n.3 (9th Cir. 1988).
104. Id. "To the extent those courts may have equated exhibition by means of television
with home video display, we reject their conclusions." Id.
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or by using the Copyright Act to conclude no public performance oc-
curred resulting in no infringement.
The Cohen Case Is Similar To Other Cases That Adopted Expansive
Interpretations Of Contract Language
Comparing the Cohen case to other cases which have interpreted
contract language broadly by including newly developed mediums illus-
trates how the Ninth Circuit's decision is inconsistent with these earlier
decisions. The courts in these cases interpreted contract language expan-
sively so as not to hinder the Copyright Act. As in L. C. Page,"°5 Cohen
involved an exhibition agreement that failed to mention the technological
improvements at issue because the improvements were not within the
contemplation of the parties at the time of the grant. While videocassette
recorders for home use were not commercially known at the time of the
Cohen grant, they were being experimented with just as talking motion
pictures were being experimented with at the time of the L.C. Page
grant."°6 Moreover, the L.C. Page rationale extends to Cohen because
videocassette display is a species of the genus television as both are exhib-
ited on the same monitors, seen by the same audiences and exploited in
the same area, private homes.
Cohen is also analogous to Bartsch and Landon. As in Bartsch, Co-
hen involved a license which was silent as to the contracting parties' in-
tent. The Cohen license also included virtually unlimited television
exhibition rights as did the Landon license. Applying Professor Nim-
mer's "ambiguous penumbra" approach adopted in Bartsch and Landon,
Paramount should be allowed to exhibit Medium Cool on videocassettes
for public distribution because that use reasonably falls within the televi-
sion exhibition medium described in the license.
While L. C. Page, Bartsch, and Landon are Second Circuit Court of
Appeals decisions not binding on the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
factual similarities indicate that a similar approach is appropriate. Autry,
however, is a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision binding on the
Cohen court. The licenses in both Autry and Cohen included nonrestric-
tive language with regard to the disputed medium. The Cohen contract
also gave Paramount the right to reproduce the song " 'by' means of tele-
vision" without any restrictions. The Cohen license included a nonexclu-
sive list of reproductions included within the "by means of television"
grant not excluding videocassette display. Thus, the Cohen court should
105. See supra notes 44-51 and accompanying text.
106. Comment, Past Copyright Licenses And The New Video Software Medium, 29
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1160, 1171 (1982).
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Remick rationale by concluding that the Court must not limit its inquiry
of the 1909 Act to its literal meaning and legislative history because the
Act was adopted years before the electronic devices at issue were devel-
oped." 5 Thus, the Act had to be read in light of those technological
advances. 116 Applying this reasoning, the Court held that cable televi-
sion operators are analogous to viewers and not performers of the pro-
grams they receive and carry. 17
More recently, the United States Supreme Court in Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios" 8 accepted J.H. Remick by concluding that the
law of copyright develops as technology develops." 9 The Court stated
that in those cases where Congress has not spoken it had to construe
potentially new rights in accordance with those already implemented by
the legislature.' 20 Therefore, the Supreme Court held that one of the
purposes of the private performance exemption from section 106(4) of
the Act was to permit the home viewing of lawfully made videotapes.' 2 '
The Performance in Cohen Falls Under The Section 110 Limitation On
The Exclusive Right To Publicly Perform A Work
As noted earlier, section 110 of the Copyright Act sets forth specific
acts which are not infringements of the exclusive right to publicly per-
form a work under section 106 of the Act. Redd Home illustrated the
Third Circuit Court of Appeals interpretation of section 110. Redd
Home is similar to Cohen because both cases address the issue of whether
in-home videocassette use constitutes a public performance in violation
of the Act. In Redd Home, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated
that selling or renting videocassettes to consumers for home viewing did
not involve copyright infringement because no public performance takes
place. In Cohen, the court specifically excluded in-home videocassette
use from the contract because the parties had no intent to bargain for
that unknown right at the time of the grant. However, the Third Circuit
Court of Appeals' conclusion that in-home videocassette use is not a pub-
lic performance implies that the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' exclu-
sion of this same use did not come under copyright law and thus should
not have been excluded from the contract.
115. Id. at 395-96.
116. Id. at 396.
117. Id. at 400-01.
118. 104 S. Ct. 774 (1984).
119. Id. at 782.
120. Id. at 783.
121. Id. at 802 n.19.
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Therefore, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision, which
equated public performances by broadcast or cable transmissions to con-
sumers and private performances entirely within control of the con-
sumer, is erroneous. 122 In reality, the two types of performances are
entirely different. While public performances by broadcast or cable
transmissions to consumers are protected by the Act, private perform-
ances of videocassettes within the control of the consumer are not pro-
tected by the Act. Thus, the Cohen court's reasoning that videocassette
display rights could not be granted by the contract because the form of
exhibition was unknown at the time of the agreement is irrelevant. There
were no rights to grant because copyright owners only possess exclusive
rights to public performances of their works. Thus Cohen, as the copy-
right owner, had no exclusive right to the private videocassette displays
at issue.
SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS OF THE CASE
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ignored the significance of the
Cohen case by choosing to rule solely on the contractual provisions.
Videocassette recorders are just one of the many technological advances
that have emerged as the entertainment industry has grown. That is evi-
denced by the many cases encountering a variety of technological devel-
opments unknown at the time of the contract. Thus, the court's decision
regarding contract language silent to the parties intent at the time of the
agreement, will likely have an impact on future actions involving devel-
opments unknown at the time of the agreement. It is therefore important
for courts to remain consistent in decisions regarding technological ad-
vances made in the entertainment industry. Unfortunately, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals' decision ignores the majority of case law deal-
ing with this issue. By disregarding cases advocating a broad interpreta-
tion of contract language silent to the parties' intent, and equating
videocassette display to television exhibition, the court has regressed
rather than progressed with the times.
The necessity for consistent decisions in cases involving previously
unknown technological advances arises from the nature of the entertain-
ment industry itself. Inconsistent decisions will retard technological de-
velopment by discouraging the contracting between parties because of
the fear that future developments will not be included within the original
grant. Thus, less creativity will result from the lack of agreements made
between copyright owners and producers. This is inconsistent with the
122. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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Copyright Act's purpose to encourage technological development and
creativity.' 23 Thus, the industry must grow as technology further devel-
ops. To do this, courts must play a pivotal role in finding a consistent
way to deal with the problems of silent contract language. Courts should
look to prior case law, any applicable statutes, and treatise material.
Finally, from an economic standpoint, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals' decision was unfair to the defendant Paramount. Ultimately
the issue boils down to revenues. Cohen's allegations resulted from Para-
mount's receipt of revenues from the videocassette sales of Medium Cool.
Therefore, the real issue concerns who is ultimately entitled to the reve-
nues earned from the videocassette sales. Looking at the license lan-
guage, it appears that those rights were granted to Paramount.
Paramount was granted exhibition rights to theatres and by means of
television. Included in the television exhibition rights were pay televi-
sion, subscription television, and closed circuit home television. Each of
these forms of exhibition by means of television is virtually indistinguish-
able from videocassette exhibition. Each requires the consumer to make
a purchase of the copyrighted work whether it be from a video store or a
cable television station. As a result of the purchase, the consumer ob-
tains complete control. The consumer decides what to purchase and for
the most part when to watch the program (i.e., on cable stations movies
are shown numerous times). Therefore, the Cohen court's control argu-
ment disintegrates when comparing videocassette display to these types
of television exhibitions explicitly granted by the Cohen license. Thus, it
appears that Cohen as copyright owner already cut himself off from a
significant amount of potential revenues. Because videocassette exhibi-
tion is analogous to the television exhibitions explicitly granted, it would
be unjust to deny Paramount that source of revenue as well.
CONCLUSION
There are two distinct approaches to the problem of interpreting
contract language silent to the parties intent because no intent existed at
the time of the agreement. The "ambiguous penumbra" approach is the
most just. This approach is advantageous to the entertainment industry
and also remains true to the purpose of the Copyright Act. Therefore,
the Ninth Circuit incorrectly held that a license granting the right to use
a song in the television exhibition of a film did not include the right to
distribute videocassettes of the film containing the song. If the court had
applied the ambiguous penumbra approach, it would have been consis-
123. See supra notes 21-27 and accompanying text.
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tent with earlier case decisions encountering similar issues. The courts in
those cases chose to adopt Nimmer's suggested approach because it coin-
cided with the needs of the entertainment industry.
Regardless of what approach the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
chose to apply, the Cohen issue could have been disposed of by a proper
interpretation of the Copyright Act and subsequent case law construing
the Act. If the Copyright Act had been applied properly, the court
should have found that in-home videocassette display is not a public per-
formance and thus does not fall under the Copyright Act. Thus, none of
Cohen's rights under the Act or the contract were ever violated by
Paramount.
Lisa Marie Agrusa
